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Policies, Regulations and Procedures and their effects on 
Mobile Money systems in Uganda 
1 Introduction	
Mobile money (MM) can help to improve access to financial services in emerging economies. In 
Africa, several mobile money systems have been developed specifically to assist the unbanked to 
get financial services. The most dominant is the mobile network operator provider-led type of system 
where mobile money customers do not need to be attached to a traditional bank account but perform 
banking transactions through their mobile networker operators (MNO). Mobile money payments have 
gained wide acceptance as an emerging payment method in both developed and emerging 
economies (Dittus and Klein, 2011). It is clear that these are fulfilling a need as a rise in the number 
of global mobile users has been predicted from 0.8 billion in 2014 to 1.8 billion in 2019 (KPMG, 
2015). This is also supported by East African Community reports of an increase in mobile money 
transactions of many millions of dollars annually (EACO, 2014) while the Bank of Uganda reports 
indicate an increase in mobile money transactions from 33 billion Uganda shillings in 2009 to 32,506 
billion Uganda shillings in 2015 (BoU, 2016).  
In nations where formal banking is not used widely, mobile money systems have been generally 
accepted as an easy means to make emergency payments and for electronic money transfers to 
settle domestic financial matters. Ndiwalana, Morawczynski and Popv (2014) note that mobile money 
systems in Uganda are commonly used to settle utility bills, school fees, medical bills and other 
debts, for buying goods, and to transfer money to relatives and friends. Hence, this is an important 
tool in the fight against financial inclusion in emerging economies and has sparked a wave of 
economic activities involving many players at various economic levels.  
UNCTAD (2012) notes that mobile money systems in emerging economies operate in complex and 
changing environments with many new players who have varying interests and objectives and whose 
roles and responsibilities may overlap. The relationships and roles of the various mobile money 
stakeholders are summarized in figure 1 below. 
 Figure 1: Roles of mobile money stakeholders (Source: Author, 2017) 
The roles of the stakeholders involved in the mobile process (shown in Figure 1) are described as 
follows:  
Regulating Bodies Set minimum operating requirements for mobile network operators; 
set know-your-customer norms; supervise mobile network operators 
Financial Institutions Host the main mobile money account on behalf of the mobile network 
operators and manage foreign exchange 
Mobile Application 
Developers 
Develop mobile money applications 
Mobile Network 
Operators (MNO) 
Host and manage individual mobile money accounts for end-users; set 
end-user operational requirements for mobile money; manage and 
control mobile money transactions; administer end-user mobile money 
accounts; responsible for the security of mobile money  
Mobile Money Agents Register mobile money users; give cash to mobile money end-users; 
keep money float on behalf of MNO; process electronic money 
Device Manufacturers Manufacture and sell mobile devices to MNO 
Mobile Money End-users Hold mobile money accounts; send electronic money; receive mobile 
cash 
The existence of diverse mobile money stakeholders involved in different levels of mobile money 
transactions is seen to be an advantage but is also a possible threat to the safety of information as 
each of the stakeholder attributes need to be considered with respect to the security for mobile 
money systems. Therefore, there is need for a strong information security management framework 
that can tap into the synergies created by the mobile money ecosystem in order to provide adequate 
security of the financial information.  
2 Literature	review	
2.1 Mobile	money	challenges	in	Africa	
Despite the fact that mobile money has generally received acceptance as a means of payment for 
addressing domestic financial problems and payment of utility bills in Africa, financial information 
breaches and other forms of information misuse seem to be common. The Observer (2013) reveals 
that on average 100 mobile money users lose money every week and some lose large quantities of 
money. Nevertheless the unreported cases may surpass the reported ones. There are a lack of 
sufficient information security strategies to support the diverse mobile money stakeholders in 
providing adequate security for key financial information. Unfortunately, limited research has been 
conducted to adequately address the mobile money information security concerns, instead it has 
been majorly left for discussion in the media (newspapers) where it often makes headlines. 
Whereas some level of information security has been proposed by information security experts to 
minimize the current mobile money challenges in Africa (Kwashaie; 2010) these measures focused 
mainly on technical tools. As a result, security roles are left in the hands of technical information 
security experts without the involvement of other mobile money stakeholders such as strategic 
managers, the end-users and the mobile money agents who take part in the transaction processes. 
Certainly, a solution that is inclined only on one side of technical security, provides an incomplete 
solution to the escalating information security concerns in mobile money systems. 
 All stakeholders in the mobile money ecosystem (see Figure 1) need to have a recognized security 
role. In addition, it has been noted that unmanaged approaches to information security lead to a 
piecemeal approach. Implementing controls, such as firewalls and CCTV cameras, encryption of 
data and the application of intrusion detection tools may not address all risks to information (ISO 
2700, 2013). The human aspect of information security to supplement the technical security tools 
and applications, and which includes policies, procedures, practices, standards, reviews and 
compliancy monitoring, helps to provide a comprehensive information security management 
framework.    
The following example is attributed to weaknesses in information security policy; Uganda mobile 
network operator X lost about USD $3.4 million when employees exploited this weakness and USD 
$ 4.7 million was spent on the associated recovery process. In the same year Rwanda’s mobile 
network operator Y lost over USD $ 170,000 when internal staff exploited information security policy 
weakness in the mobile money system (CGPA, 2014:13). These examples indicate that the 
information security management of information in mobile money has not been addressed well 
because in both incidences mentioned it was not technical weakness such as hacking the mobile 
money system but information security policy issues. Therefore, the need for the sharing of the 
information security management role among the varying mobile money stakeholders is overdue.   
Most African countries seem to copy the M-PESA mobile money platform of Kenya and hence share 
related mobile money challenges. The lack of awareness by mobile money customers about the 
risks involved in  mobile money payments in Kenya that Luvanda, Kimani and Kimele (2014) 
compared to a time bomb waiting to explode at any time is not different from the fears of Kwashaie 
(2010) about mobile money in Ghana. Masamila (2014) also notes that mobile money users in 
Tanzania are not likely to be aware of the risks associated with mobile money payments and this 
makes them susceptible to fraudulent schemes. There have been, however, attempts in various 
African countries to regulate their mobile money services. In Uganda, Bank of Uganda  mobile money 
guidelines (BoU, 2013) play an important role, the central bank of Kenya (Act 2009) plays similar 
role, and Rwanda law regulations relating to electronic messages, electronic signatures and 
electronic transactions guide mobile payments in that country (NBR 2010). The mobile money 
payments in Tanzania are under the umbrella of the electronic schemes guidelines 2007 (BOT, 
2007). However, according to UNCTAD (2012), the mobile money regulatory tools in Africa are 
characterized by gaps and overlaps. At the same time there is limited experience that African 
countries can obtain from advanced and mature economies when drafting relevant policies, 
regulations and practices because it is believed that the first mobile money, M-PESA, was started in 
Africa (Mbiti and Weil, 2011). 
2.2 Mobile	Money	Information	Security	Management	Concerns	
No tangible receipt is given to mobile money end-users involved in a transaction process to indicate 
the successful conclusion of the transaction (Simpson, 2014), although it is true that an SMS is 
usually received by the mobile money end-user to verify completion of the transaction as is the case 
with mobile banking by conventional banks. However, full transaction details are not shared in the 
case of mobile money in contrast with conventional banks which send detailed transaction 
information via emails and also have downloadable updates that can easily be obtained and saved 
by the customers for future reference purposes. The mobile money end-user has to rely entirely on 
the SMS and if the phone is stolen the history of mobile money SMS is very difficult, if not impossible 
to retrieve.  
  
Figure 2:  Mobile Money registration and transfer process in East Africa (Source: Author, 2017) 
As shown in Error! Reference source not found., in the mobile money transactions process a 
limited transactions history is obtained apart from the SMS and no tangible receipt given to mobile 
money user as proof of transaction. 
UNCTAD (2012) notes that the first users of mobile money services in Africa had mobile phones that 
were not registered and these users have continued to access the service despite the fact that 
recently mobile phone registration is one of the first steps required to get access to mobile money 
services. The fact that mobile network operators still allow unregistered mobile phone users to 
access mobile money services in a country such as Uganda puts mobile money end-users’ 
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information at risk because it is difficult to trace an unregistered mobile phone user who has no 
national identification card or passport after an illegal transaction has been made.  
The introduction of mobile money in East African countries was built on a weak policy and procedural 
foundation because the mobile network operators received “a simple letter of no objection” from the 
central bank to start the mobile money business (Mbiti and Weil, 2011). As in Uganda, UNCTAD 
(2012) agree with Mbiti and Weil (2011) that the first mobile money platform (M-PESA) in Kenya was 
also largely managed by and was started by MNO following “a simple letter of no objection” from the 
central banks. 
One can conclude that mobile money systems in East Africa kicked off without comprehensive 
controls, guidance and compliance monitoring from the regulatory bodies, resulting in the current 
information security management abuses and resultant financial losses to both mobile money end-
users and mobile network operators. 
Unlike in the conventional financial services where bank customers are required to produce their 
identification documents before permitted to withdraw cash at the counter from their accounts, the 
story with mobile money is different. For mobile money, identification documents are commonly 
required at the registration phase only, mobile money agents issue out cash to mobile money 
customer provided they know the phone number and PIN for a particular line. No verification of 
identities is carried out at the cash out phase, yet cell phones can easily be accessed, lost or even 
stolen putting the e-money at risk and breach of information to illegal users.  
Harris, Goodman and Traynor (2013) claim that the introduction of mobile money in East Africa was 
also not accompanied by sufficient concern for privacy, opening doors to abuse and financial loss. 
A privacy breach, for instance, that allows others to know that a client has recently transferred a 
large amount into a particular account could make that account a target. It common practice for 
mobile money agent to attend two or even more mobile money customers at the same time on the 
same counter that raises the risk of information breaches to untargeted customers. 
3 Research	Methodology	
3.1 Study	Focus	
The study focuses on a deep exploration of mobile money information security management policies, 
procedures and practices suitable to guide mobile money systems in Africa. Previous studies of 
mobile money systems that attempted to address the information security concerns focused mainly 
on technical security tools which alone cannot adequately address the information security question. 
The full scope of this study includes: (i) Study existing information security management policies, 
procedures, practices and standards and determine their strengths and weaknesses. (ii) Develop 
information security management framework for mobile money systems in Uganda. (iv) Validate the 
information security management framework developed. This paper addresses only the first of these 
objectives. 
3.2 Methods	
A qualitative, multi-case study strategy will be used in order to get an in-depth understanding of 
mobile money systems’ information security challenges and concerns. The research participants will 
include the MNO who play a coordination and management role in mobile money activities, the 
mobile money agents who register the mobile money end-users, have access to mobile money 
information and process mobile money and the end-users who use the mobile money systems. The 
data collection will include observation, face-to-face interviews and has been preceded by a review 
of existing commentaries and published work on policies, procedures, regulations and practices 
about mobile money services. In addition, to achieve the first objective of the study, a comprehensive 
literature review has been conducted to obtain preliminary findings (see Section 4). The other data 
collection methods shall be used in the future stages of this research in addressing the remaining 
objectives and obtaining empirical findings and the final conclusions the thesis.  
4 Preliminary	findings	
The findings of this paper are from the document review and there is no empirical component being 
reported yet. The literature related to existing policies, procedures, regulations and standards reveals 
that, despite the benefits of mobile money systems, mobile network operators experience information 
security oversight challenges when protecting financial information during and after the transactions. 
Previous studies of mobile money have attempted to address the security problem but gave 
piecemeal solutions that focus on security tools and pay little attention to the strategic management 
of information security (policies, awareness, training and ethics) leading to a situation that has left 
the problem not fully addressed. 
The Uganda national ICT policy (2012) reveals that there is lack of a national information security 
management framework and indeed information security in developing countries is still in its infancy. 
A national information security management framework should provide a basis for mobile money 
regulation bodies in the country in order to guide and direct the implementation of adequate policies 
and procedures for the operation of mobile money activities.  
Mobile money transactions are based largely on trust between the end users and the agents because 
the mobile money end user receives no tangible receipt from the agents on completion of the 
transaction. To make it worse there is no contractual obligation between the mobile money end users 
and the agents who undertake the bulk of the mobile money key activities. This poses a serious risk 
for mobile money end users because the legal basis is weak if they wish to raise a complaint. The 
SMS that is received by the mobile money end user to mark the failure or success of a financial 
transaction may not stand up in court as it is the only evidence available and could be falsified.    
The recent “A” mobile money guidelines (drawn up in 2013) to address mobile money challenges 
have placed attention on the safety of financial information in mobile money transactions but the 
need for a collective information security role for the diverse stakeholders is not mentioned. These 
guidelines also indicate little concern for privacy in mobile money transactions exposing mobile 
money end users’ accounts to risks of information breach. A guideline that leaves room for the 
exposure of financial information to third parties without obtaining permission and approval from the 
owner puts the mobile money end-user account at risk and makes it a target for abuse. It has been 
observed (and it appears to be common practice in Africa) for a mobile money agent to serve two 
mobile money end users at the same counter at the same time. This creates risks of financial 
information exposure and abuse.  
Evans and Pirchio (2015) contend that MNO led mobile money systems that dominate in low income 
countries Uganda inclusive are characterized by what they termed as “light touch regulations”. The 
light touch regulations mainly enforce minimal requirements about who should provide mobile money 
services, impose light Know Your Customer (KYC) requirements and limited restrictions and controls 
who should serve as mobile money agent. In a rich data environment of mobile money ecosystem 
where there are many stakeholders with varying interests and goals absence strong regulatory 
framework demands strong information security management framework to mitigate information 
breaches and subsequence system abuses. 
UNCTAD (2012) points out that there is insufficient information security advice given to mobile 
money end users (customers) by the MNO. New registrants are not briefed nor are they given 
information related to how to minimize information security abuses in mobile money transactions. 
Instead these end users have to figure out how to navigate such pitfalls if and when they occur. 
Although MNO websites usually include frequently asked questions, questions and answers 
concerning information security issues surrounding mobile money systems are limited. Yet most 
mobile money users in Uganda, due to their limited exposure to computers and low computer literacy, 
neither have sufficient skills to use the internet nor are ready to access it. 
The policy that guides the authorization and authentication methods used to access the mobile 
money application is weak given the fact that, as noted above, there are still anonymous mobile 
money users due to loose restriction on identification of users. The four digit PIN used by the mobile 
money users never changes or prompts the user to update it, and this is a problem since the majority 
of the users are unware of the information security preventative measures that can be used to 
minimize information breaches and abuses. 
Atanu et al (2014) reveal that key mobile money activities and information for mobile money systems 
are handled by a network of third parties (mobile money agents) who have no contractual obligations 
to the mobile money end users. Mobile money agents register and manage mobile money customer 
information including mobile money account particulars. They process customer requests, process 
electronic money and give out cash.  Exposure of mobile money information to third parties not only 
erodes privacy of customer transactions but also increases the risks of information security breaches 
because most mobile money agents also have limited knowledge and skills about information 
security management. Most of the abuses in mobile money systems have not been attributed to 
highly skilled hackers but to breaches of information by key stakeholders like agents, internal staff 
of MNO and unawareness of end-users about the information security risks surrounding mobile 
money transactions.   
5 Conclusions	and	recommendations	
Mobile money services have developed rapidly in developing economies and their benefits are 
enormous as outlined above. Their role in the fight against financial exclusion should not be 
underestimated. However, despite their benefits, mobile money systems in emerging economies 
raise critical information security concerns and challenges. 
The future of successful and sustained mobile money use will depend on the implementation of 
comprehensive information security policies, guidelines, regulations and practices to assist the 
various key stakeholders whose interests and goals vary as illustrated in Table 1: 
Table 1: Mobile money stakeholders’ information security risks and concerns 
Stakeholder Role and Information security risks and concerns 
Regulating bodies Regulate and control mobile money service companies. However two 
independent regulators exist (“A” and “B”) who have varying interests in 
mobile money systems. Each of these intend to get full control of mobile 
network operators yet neither of them has laid out comprehensive 
information security strategies to protect mobile money financial information. 
“A” tends to focus mainly on monetary control while “B” controls 
communication, leaving the security of the mobile money not fully addressed 
by either body.   
Financial 
Institutions 
Using the policy of regulating body “A”, the financial institutions’ background 
role is managing main mobile money accounts on behalf of the mobile 
network operators. However, financial institutions and mobile networker 
operators seem to be competitors, thus mobile banking is competing against 
mobile money services therefore trusting data with your competitor raises 
some level safety information risks to mobile network operators.  
The public image of the mobile network operators is at stake if there are 
incidents of information breaches and abuse by the financial institution. This 
is because in mobile money operations, only MNO have binding obligations 
with mobile money end-users yet both the financial institutions MNO have 
access to financial information for mobile money end-users. 
Mobile Money 
Application 
Developers 
These employees develop the mobile money applications but at the same 
time, they may be users of the applications they have developed because 
they are also mobile money customers. Mobile money application 
developers are experts who know the security weaknesses of the application 
they have developed and changes of exploiting those weaknesses in 
absence of strong information security policies, procedures and practices. 
Mobile Network 
Operators (MNO) 
MNO control and manage individual mobile money accounts for their 
customers and they are key players of mobile money security role. The 
mobile money information security role not been shared among all 
stakeholders and that leaves the mobile money security concerns not fully 
dressed. 
Mobile Money 
Agents 
These people register mobile money customers, process mobile money and 
give out cash yet they do not have binding contractual agreements with the 
mobile money customers. The fact that they have access to copies of 
financial information belonging to mobile money customers but they have no 
contractual obligation with them puts customers’ information at risk and 
therefore, there is a need for strong information security policies, procedures, 
practices and regulations.  
Mobile Device 
Manufacturers 
These parties sell mobile devices such as the mobile phones sold to MNO. 
The mobile phone comes with the manufacturers’ operating system and that 
may need to be scrutinized by MNO for security reasons. There is a 
possibility that a hidden code in the operating system has been inserted 
(possibly by a third party) and is intended to steal and share customer 
information with third parties. Therefore, there is need for collective 
information security roles among all the stakeholders including device 
manufacturers and this calls for strong international policies and practices. 
Mobile Money 
End-users 
(Customers) 
The mobile money customers use the mobile money application to do 
transactions through the mobile money agents. In most cases they are the 
ones who are affected by weak policies, procedures and practices. Literature 
reviewed indicates that most of the customers have limited skills, training and 
awareness about information security risks in mobile money payments and 
their security role remains inadequate.  
Comprehensive guidelines are needed to bridge identified gaps such as: 
 the information security role is not shared among mobile money stakeholders,  
 allowing unregistered mobile phone users to get access to mobile money services constitutes a 
risk,  
 there is a lack of concern for privacy in mobile money transactions,  
 the use of third parties to handle customers’ financial information needs monitoring and controls.  
These weaknesses have been identified from the referenced literature. The following stage of the 
research will focus on checking whether these are considered to be real and pervasive problems, 
how they affect the various stakeholders, and finding ways to implement the recommendations. 
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